题目：Losing target: Randomized environmental inspections and law enforcement efficiency

时间：2023年10月11日（星期三）14:00 主楼601

报告人：张炳（南京大学教授、南京财经大学副校长）

摘要：Random inspection is considered a law enforcement method that can decrease the likelihood of collusion between supervisors and supervised objects. Using over 160,000 inspection records from 2016 to 2019, this study examined how China’s implementation of randomized environmental inspections affects law enforcement efficiency. We find that random inspections reduce the overall efficiency of law enforcement. Random inspections revealed 11% fewer environmental problems and 5% fewer environmental violations than non-random inspections. Further examination of the mechanisms reveals that the implementation of random inspections hinders the utilization of local officials' specialized knowledge in effectively targeting polluting companies and identifying violations, thereby diminishing the overall efficiency of law enforcement. To develop more effective enforcement strategies, policymakers should weigh the benefits of random inspections in reducing collusion against the drawbacks in losing target.

报告人简介：张炳，南京财经大学副校长，毕业于南京大学环境学院，主要从事环境管理与政策分析、环境经济学的教学和研究，2013年获得国家自然科学基金优秀青年科学基金资助。2018年获得国家自然科学基金杰出青年科学基金资助。论文发表在Nature Sustainability、PNAS、QJE、AJPS、JPubE、JDE、JEEM、JPAM、JCE等杂志。参与我国排污许可证、排污交易、环境信息公开等政策的制定，研究成果获得环保部科技奖一等奖、二等奖、张培刚发展经济学优秀成果奖等奖励。